Over seventy years ago, Étienne Gilson showed the parallels between Descartes' Les météores and the Coimbrans' textbook that was based on Aristotle's Meteorology. The topics treated in Descartes' work follow those found in the frequently-taught Jesuit textbook. They both discussed the formation of clouds, rain, rainbows and other lights in the sky, minerals and salts, and the cause of winds and earthquakes. 1 The similarities do not end at the structure and topics treated that Gilson pointed out but extend to large portions of the treatises' content. To be sure, differences appear, but many Aristotelian meteorological concepts are found throughout Descartes' treatise without being changed at all or only in a minor way. Descartes'
and formal causes should be part of meteorological explanations had already begun before Descartes and continued into the middle of the seventeenth century. Aristotelian commentators on the meteorology cannot be thought of as a homogenous group of authors; rather, their views varied widely. The supposed novelty of eliminating substantial forms from meteorology, however, was in fact no novelty at all. Descartes' meteorological theories should not be understood as revolutionary but rather as a continuation of earlier debates. To understand why the field of meteorology differed from other parts of natural philosophy it is necessary to return to both Aristotle and his commentators.
ARISTOTLE'S METEOROLOGY 13 Ibid., p. 430. On this letter and the meaning of the word "mechanical" in Descartes and Froidmont, see Gabbey, "What was 'Mechanical' about 'The Mechanical Philosophy'?," p. 18. The last two lines of the above translation are taken from Gabbey. 14 See Gideon Manning's article in this volume for a discussion of the exchange between Froidmont and Descartes. See Daniel Garber's contribution for a general discussion of the term "mechanical philosophy" in the seventeenth century.
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The seventeenth-century creators of new philosophies that competed against Aristotelian models prided themselves on their dependence on fewer causes. Even though few historians now trust the accuracy of claims of the complete independence of the promoters of such novel natural philosophies -they contain caricatures rather than portraits of scholastic thoughtit is still generally accepted that Aristotelian natural philosophy privileged final and formal causation over material and efficient causation. This privileging is stated explicitly in the Physics, among other places, and is apparent in numerous treatises, such as the biological and psychological works. 15 For example, sensation and intellection are understood in terms of form and as actualities of potentialities; and the parts of living beings are considered with respect to their being "for the sake of something." Nevertheless, despite the overall emphasis on forms and ends, Aristotelian works also discussed material and efficient causation; and according to Aristotle it is possible to give explanations, perhaps not always complete explanations, of large portions of the natural world using just matter and motion. In fact Descartes was aware of the significant roles played by material and efficient causation in Peripatetic philosophy, as he contended that his use of shape, motion, and size in physics corresponded to some of the principles that Aristotle employed.
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For Aristotle there were limits to teleology just as there were limits to material explanations of nature. A detailed explanation of the varying virtues of the causes is found in
Meteorology IV 12. 17 Contemporary scholars, as well as numerous medieval and early modern commentators, have considered this chapter as well as the entirety of Meteorology IV to be an introduction to biology, a bridge between discussions of the elements, qualities, and the formation of homeomerous substances to discussions of the functions that these substances have in animate beings. 18 6 anhomeomerous substances such as organs, and finally to entire organisms at the top. The level of a substance within this hierarchy corresponds to the kind of causation that should be used to explain it. Thus, organs are known with respect to final causality, with respect to the "for the sake of something" tou heneka, that is, their function within an organism, even though they are simultaneously composed of an underlying matter and are the matter, which composes the entire organism. The characteristics of the homeomerous bodily parts -the flesh, blood, and bone, that is, the matter of these organs -however, can be known through what Gill calls material necessity because, "these things come to be by heat and cold and their combined motions." 20 The preceding eleven chapters to Meteorology IV discuss this material necessity, the motions caused by the hot and the cold. Similarly to Gill, David Furley stresses this book's reliance on matter and motion, 21 on "unqualified necessity," identical to Gill's "material necessity," as the primary explanation.
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Even though Meteorology IV 1-11 explores material properties as the result of matter and motion, the creation of primarily but not exclusively animate homeomerous substances is seen through the prism of teleology. The actions of the hot and cold participate in the process of concoction, whereby an unformed substance attains its perfected form, or, in the terms of medieval and Renaissance scholars, becomes a perfect mixture. Concoction is a type of teleiōsis, and although this book explains how the hot and the cold cause physical transmutation, these transmutations are often seen with regard to specific ends. The fact that even the "material necessity" of Meteorology IV is subordinate, at least partially, to final causes does not mean that there are no limits to Aristotelian teleology. Although Meteorology IV explains why and where there are limits to teleology, the three preceding books of the Meteorology, the three books that actually treat meteorological themes, are a better place to examine Aristotelian natural philosophy that has little recourse to final and formal causes. followed the priority implied in the act of becoming and the completion of this act. Later medieval scholars, such as Jean Buridan (1300-1358) and Blasius of Parma (ca. 1400)
contended that the differing scopes of the first three books and the fourth one match the change from imperfect mixtures to perfect mixtures. 34 It was this view that was to dominate throughout the Renaissance and well into the seventeenth century.
During the Renaissance, the intractability and imperfection of meteorological phenomena was a basis for emphasizing the conjectural nature of natural science (scientia).
Two of the most famed philosophers of the early sixteenth century, Nifo and Pomponazzi, put forth this position. Nifo, who was a professor of philosophy in several Italian universities, used meteorology and Aristotle's confession of the inability to understand all causes in order to distinguish the natural sciences from the mathematical. He wrote: "It must be said that natural science is not a science simpliciter, such as the mathematical sciences are, but is a science that explains the why (propter quid). It is the science of finding the causes which can be held through a conjectural syllogism that gives the propter quid of the effect." This account of the effect however is not definitive. He supported this position by his use of Aristotle's meteorology, and argued that, "Aristotle in the book of the Meteorology concedes that he does Nifo's contemporary and rival Pietro Pomponazzi's take on the intractability of meteorological phenomena led to an even more skeptical view of the nature of natural philosophy. According to his view, the idea of a complete science is held only by fools;
meteorology is proof that we will never be able to have an accurate account of the entire natural world. Pomponazzi maligned both religious thinkers who argued that meteorological events, disasters in particular, were the result of the will of God, and those "stupid philosophers" and "Peripatetics," the latter being a category in which probably most of his contemporaries included him, who want to know everything, and proclaim that all events can be traced back to "movement of the heaven." 36 Moreover he contended that unlike Seneca,
Aristotle did not believe that earthquakes and winds have final causes. 37 For Pomponazzi, meteorology is evidence for the absence of determinism and purpose in the universe and for the existence of limits for human knowledge. If Aristotelian meteorology without formal causes is easy to imagine, the same can be true for final ones. Neither the Coimbrans mentioned them, nor did Sennert. Eustachius, however, wrote that the final cause of meteorology was the moderation of the weather, the perfection of the universe, and the manifestation of divine power and wisdom. 48 Froidmont argued that winds were useful to mankind by stopping putrefaction and making the world temperate. 49 Similarly, Resta contended that winds thin out the air and make the weather more temperate. 50 Given that much of the subject of meteorology was disaster-provoking weather and geological events, others followed Pomponazzi who lambasted those who thought everything had a purpose. This line of thought did not have to wait until Voltaire and the Lisbon earthquake of 1755. Furthermore, the conviction of those who held that there were entelechies for the weather does not appear to be strong. Froidmont, who wrote scholia on Seneca's Naturales quaestiones, a work that attempted to demonstrate the connectedness of the world to divinity through a number of meteorological examples, did not press particularly hard on this issue in his attack on Les météores. He took issue with the lack of teleology in Descartes' discussions of organisms but not in his polemics against his meteorology. 
